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1. Introduction
The informal sector in most developing economies is not only large but has
been growing quickly in recent decades. In 1999 an estimated 68% of the total
work force in Kenya outside smallholder agriculture worked within the so-
called ‘informal sector’
1 (Kenya, 2000). The share of informal employment in
manufacturing was even higher
2. Understanding why the relative importance of
informal employment is increasing is of utmost importance for development
policy. How does the performance of informal enterprises compare with that of
the formal ones? What accounts for the difference and what are the long-term
implications for industry-based economic growth? Can the government permit
an increasing share of economic activity in a non-taxable sector?
The purpose of this paper is to explain why an increasing share of small
firms in Kenya is informal. We will consider explanatory factors ranging from
human capital to economic networks and ethnicity. We will investigate how
these factors relate to informal-formal sector differences by concentrating on
three main issues: the choice of formality status at start-up; differences in
productivity between formal and informal firms; and differences in growth and
investment rates of African and Asian firms.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a review of the
costs and benefits of informality. Section 3 describes the informal sector in
Kenya, which has an indigenous name, the Jua Kali (Swahili for Hot Sun).
Econometric analysis of choice of informality and implications for productivity,
efficiency and growth is conducted in section 4. A summary of the main
findings and a discussion of their policy implications conclude the paper.
                                                          
1 According to the definition adopted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, an informal
firm is  one that is not in the books of the Registrar of Companies.
2 Informal manufacturing accounted for 79% of total manufacturing employment in
1997.3
2. Why informal?
In his classical article on the dual economy model Lewis (1954) treated the
small-scale, traditional sector as a reservoir of surplus labour without growth
potential. The sector was seen as a temporary disequilibrium phenomenon,
which would shrink as the modern sector absorbed the labour surplus. As the
evolution in the subsequent decades showed, however, this prediction was
wrong. The industrial structure in Africa has remained dual, with a large
number of very small firms and a small number of medium and large-scale
firms. These small firms typically work with very limited capital, use simple
technologies, and tend to cut costs by evading taxes, ignoring minimum wage
laws and so on. The concept of the “informal sector” was coined in the early
1970s to characterise these firms. A lively debate on the definition and potential
of the sector ensued. Several studies, for example the influential 1972 ILO
report on employment in Kenya argued, contrary to Lewis, that the sector could
provide a basis for employment creation and growth even in the longer term.
In this literature, one or more of three criteria is used to define the informal
sector (Mead and Morrison, 1996). The first one is size, where the concept of
informal is restricted to self-employed and micro-enterprises with less than 10-
20 employees. The second criterion concerns legal informality, that is informal
enterprises are not registered and do not comply with legal obligations
concerning safety, taxes, labour laws etc. The third criterion indicates that the
firms should have limited physical and human capital per worker. Sometimes
the sector also is referred to as the low wage sector. The common point of all
these attempts at defining the informal sector is, of course, that there is a dual
structure in the economy, with a formal sector and an informal sector.
3
Some still argue that the existence of informal firms is a short-term
disequilibrium phenomenon, but the fact that these firms have grown rapidly in
number is evidence against this explanation. Transactions costs, information
                                                          
3 Fontin, Marceau, and Savard (1997) emphasise the three aspects mentioned above
and refer to them as scale, evasion, and wage dualism.4
asymmetries and market failures may explain their persistence.
4 Furthermore,
management requirements are less exacting in an informal firm. They may find
it easier to control labour and have better access to family labour power. There
are also government policies and regulations such as labour laws concerning
minimum wages, workers safety, working hours etc that need not be adhered to
by informal firms. Then there are taxes and fees, which weigh heavily on
formal firms but not informal ones, as do various urban planning regulations.
There may also be economic and financial regulations, for example price
controls, licensing of various sorts, as well as laws pertaining to property rights
that the informal firms can avoid. When there are fluctuations in demand it may
be easier for informal firms to adjust given their flexible technologies and hence
avoid the costs associated with idle capacity. The ease by which an informal
firm can vary the employment level may save on wage costs. Limited
managerial ability and ability to cope with the requirements of formality may
also make entrepreneurs stay in the informal segment of the economy.
The costs of formality that we have discussed above are associated with the
entry and operation in compliance with all legal requirements.
5 An informal
firm avoids all these by staying informal. However, there are also costs of
informality, such as the continuous risk of being detected and punished by the
state for not being formal. Also, informal firms cannot enjoy the services
provided by the state, most notably institutions providing jurisdictional services
such as policing, contract enforcement and protection against burglars. Unclear
legal status also means that they cannot easily get access to financial and
banking services and other commercial services. They may, for example, be
unable to use formal channels of dispute resolution due to uncertain legal status.
In a contribution to the debate on the character and role of the informal
sector, Harris (1990) has suggested a classification of the various views on the
sector along two dimensions. First, does the sector have a growth potential or
                                                          
4 For a good discussion of small firms generally see Fafchamps (1994).
5 Loayza (1997) provides a useful discussion of the costs and benefits of legal status.5
not, and secondly is it autonomous or integrated with the formal sector? Figure





  Figure 1. Views on the formal - informal sector interrelationships.
For the pessimists, the sector is either marginalized or exploited. For the
optimists, it is either dual or complementary to the formal sector. A recent paper
by Ranis and Stewart (1999) extends this discussion and presents a model,
where the informal sector is considered to be heterogeneous, so that firms can
be either productive and dynamic or stagnant and traditional. The authors go on
to analyse the factors that determine the growth of the informal sector, which
would have to be based on the dynamic segment of the sector. A key factor is
the degree of integration with the formal sector. The higher this is, the higher
the growth potential. More rapid growth in the formal sector and more even
distribution of income also increase demand for informal sector products and
thus promotes its growth.
The division of the informal sector into a progressive dynamic and a stagnant
low-income sub sector is not new.
6 Few would contest that there exist examples
of informal production in developing countries that conforms to each of the four
perspectives in Figure 1.
Apart from the aspects already discussed, the character of their markets also
affects the choice of formality status among small firms in Kenya. Small firms
in Kenya have few assets that can be seized in case of contract breaches, and
their transactions are so small that the monetary and time costs associated with
court actions would not be justified in any case. There is evidence that small
firms in Kenya seldom go to court (Kimuyu, 1997, Bigsten et al., 2000).
Entrepreneurs instead choose trading practices that minimise the risk for
contract breaches. Fafchamps (1999) identifies two types of institutional
                                                          
6 See Ranis and Stewart (1999, footnote 7), King (1996, Chapter 6) and ILO (1995).6
responses that aim to reduce transactions costs, the development of
relationships and the sharing of information within networks. When the search
and verification costs are high it makes sense to try to establish long-term
relationships with other market participants to economise on such costs. The
most common information sharing mechanism is the referral system, where a
customer or supplier approaches an economic agent with a recommendation
from a joint acquaintance (Fafchamps, 1999). When businessmen engage in
shared social activities, the likelihood of finding common acquaintances
increases as does the shared information. Well-connected agents are more likely
to trade among themselves, since they can easily find and screen each other.
Group membership thus provides network externalities and a competitive edge.
Such network externalities may restrict market entry. Agents that can screen
each other on the basis of information from their own community become less
willing to spend resources on the screening of individuals from outside the
network. They prefer to deal with members of their own network. This may
lead to the emergence of different market segments with different network
externalities.
3. Jua Kali – Kenya
3.1 Characteristics of the Jua Kali Sector
The Kenyan Jua Kali sector covers a wide variety of activities mainly in urban
areas, but also in rural Kenya. Recent figures suggest that that micro and small-
scale enterprises’ contribution to GDP range from 18% to 30%.
7 In Kenya,
there are 43 micro and small-scale enterprises for every 1000 Kenyans with an
average of 1.8 employees (CBS/KREP/ICEG, 1999). MSEs with a single
                                                          
7 In 1994 it was estimated that the micro and small-scale enterprise (MSE) sector
contributed some 13% of GDP in 1994 (Daniels, 1999, p. 57).7
employee are a minority, only a third are home based, and less than half are
women owned.
8
Jua Kali activities are concentrated in specific parts of the cities, where
services are available and markets are nearby. Some operate from fixed
locations and others from transitory to obviate government harassment. The
majority of informal sector entrepreneurs are tenants, a few are landlords, while
others are squatters who neither pay nor own the space they use. Informal food
processing, woodworking and metal fabricating enterprises typically operate
from make shift shacks. Local authorities often destroy the structures in order to
relocate them. Due to the temporary nature of the premises, infrastructural
services such as water and electricity are difficult to supply, thereby limiting the
technological choices available to the enterprises
Aboagye (1986) demonstrates that the average age of the Jua Kali
enterprises is less than six years. This age varies according to location and
activity. Those in Nairobi and Mombasa are relatively younger than those in the
smaller towns. The first two years of a Jua Kali enterprise seem critical for
survival. Absence of entry barriers creates severe competition that leads to the
demise of the less efficient and poorly managed enterprises.
Most output from the Jua Kali sector satisfies demand for food and other
basic needs by the low and middle income rural and urban Kenyans. Prices are
lower than for formal sector products, but the quality is also often lower.
However, some of the high quality furniture sold in the formal sector is
supplied by Jua Kali enterprises providing an important interlinkage between
the two sectors. Contracts with Jua Kali enterprises are often more flexible and
customer relationships more personal than in the formal sector. The reputation
of individual entrepreneurs is therefore important. Unfortunately, most Jua Kali
firms do not live long enough to build the necessary reputation with customers
and supporting networks.
                                                          
8 Women account for less than a half of the MSE entrepreneurs, 40% of the sector’s
employment and dominate commercial and textile activities. Women enterprises also
start smaller, use less start-up capital, grow slower, show uniquely different credit use
patterns and are more likely to operate from homes(Parker and Torres, 1994).8
An important part of the informal entrepreneurship involves engaging in
both formal sector jobs and informal activities. Some informal entrepreneurs
initially learn their skills while working in the formal sector, although training
also flows in the opposite direction. In a few cases, formal retail and wholesale
stores contract informal enterprises to make specific products by prepaying the
informal workshops for procurement of raw materials. Incidences of extension
of supplier credit from formal to informal firms also occur although these are
limited to firms with long-established trading relationships.
3.2 Changes in government policies towards the Jua Kali sector
The assortment of heterogeneous trade, manufacturing, transportation and
service activities that constitute the informal sector and the peculiarities that
bind them were first recognised by the East African Royal Commission in the
early 1950s. At the time, they were viewed as urban settlements that were
important for African commerce and as growth centres that embodied local
talent. Twenty year later, an ILO mission synthesised the myriad issues
surrounding informal industry and commerce and brought them out for public
debate. The mission recommended elimination of official harassment, increased
legitimacy, development of informal technology and  promotion of linkages
between the sector and the rest of the economy.
Subsequently, policy proposals concerning the sector were dominated by the
need to address the need for credit and extension services. It was in the second
half of the 1980s that the policy needs of the sector become part of Kenya's
political agenda as evidenced by repeated visits by the head of state to areas of
Nairobi known for the concentration of informal activities. During such visits,
construction of shacks shacks, formation of networks, security of tenure of
informal premises, sub-contracting and inclusion of informal sector concerns in
the country’s industrial strategy become part of the policy debate (Kimuyu,
1994). The 1986 Sessional Paper on economic management and growth paid
tribute to the virtues of the sector, including its ability to conserve foreign
exchange, create jobs, develop skills and promote local entrepreneurship9
(Kenya, 1986). The paper also underscored the need to improve the sector’s
image, which was hitherto poor.
Issues touched on in the sessional paper were picked up by the 1989-93
development plan (Kenya, 1989). The government had put together what was
referred to as the Centre Project in 1987, which in turn led to the Small
Enterprise Development Project of 1989, the precursor to a Sessional paper on
small scale and Jua Kali enterprises, a blue print for the future development of
the sector.
The general policy orientation towards the informal sector in recent years
embraces the overall privatisation and liberalisation thrust of structural
adjustment  in which the small business sector is encouraged to meet it own
needs. The government’s  role is limited to the creation of an enabling
environment through the development of infrastructure, provision of technical
information, facilitation of linkages between large and small enterprises,
promotion  of networking and development of appropriate laws and regulations
(McCormick, 1999).
3.3. The Ethnic Dimension
Networks in Kenya have an important ethnic dimension. The Indian
community in Kenya emerged when the English colonial power at the end of
the 19
th century brought in Indian workers to help build the railway to Lake
Victoria. In 1902 they numbered as many as 32,000. Most of them eventually
went home, but about 6,500 remained. The majority of those set up small stores
and started trading, while other took up intermediate positions in private
industry or the public sector. A three-tier society along racial lines was
established in colonial Kenya, with the Asians in an intermediate position.
9
African traders and businessmen were also making some progress, but during
the whole colonial period trade and business continued to be dominated by
Europeans and Asians. The coming of independence in 1963 implied a change
                                                          
9 See Bigsten (1986) for an analysis of the distributional implications.10
in the interracial distribution of both political power and income. New avenues
were opened up for African entrepreneurs, but they still suffered from the
effects of long-lasting discrimination.  The ethnic dimension will therefore be
emphasized in the analysis below.
4.  Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis considers data from Kenyan manufacturing, collected in
the first half of the 1990s. We will investigate mean differences of key variables
related to production, human capital and networks between informal and formal
small firms, and, given the strong ethnic patterns in Kenyan manufacturing, also
between firms managed by Kenyans of African origin and those of Asian
origin. The criterion used to define the informal sector in this study is whether
the firms comply with the legal requirement of registration, but all the firms
included in the sample are also small and have limited capital, which are used to
define informality in some studies.
In the following sub-section we present the data set, and discuss the
informality-formality distinction and the ethnic pattern. In subsequent sub-
sections we will discuss the factors influencing the choice of formality status at
start-up, differences in the levels of productivity, and differences in investment
and growth rates.
4.1  Data
The data analysed in this paper consists of a sample of small firms in four
Kenyan manufacturing sectors. The data are drawn from the Regional
Programme for Enterprise Development (RPED) survey, initiated by the World
Bank in the early 1990s, on manufacturing industries in seven Sub-Saharan
countries. The surveys comprise informal and formal firms of various sizes and
aimed to find explanations for the sluggish supply response to the structural
adjustment programmes implemented in the region. The Kenyan survey was
conducted for three consecutive years (1993-95). The sampling for formal firms
was done on the basis of the government’s register of formal sector firms with
the Registrar of Companies. The sampling of the informal firms was made with11
the help of the Central Bureau of Statistics, which listed all informal firms in
the major informal sector areas of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Eldoret.
From these list we randomly selected firms in proportion to the shares of the
respective sub-sectors and towns in informal employment.
The unbalanced panel comprises a total of 658 observations of 276 firms in
the food, wood, textile and metal industries. Since the total data set contains
firms with up to 4000 workers, we have restricted our attention to a sub-sample
of small firms with 12 workers or less, which comprises 71 informal and 40
formal firms observed 266 times.
10 We coda a firm as informal if it is not in the
Registrar of Companies. This the classification used by the Central Bureau of
Statistics (Economic Survey, 1998). The balance of formal and informal
establishments in our sub-sample is by no means representative of the
population since the survey was strongly stratified, giving much larger weight
to formal than to informal firms. Based on official statistics, there are about 75
informal firms to every formal one in the 1-5 worker segment, and around 15 in
the 6-20 worker category.
11 Still, very small formal firms do exist. Out of the 40
formal establishments, 16 had five workers or less.
In addition to the distinction of formal and informal entrepreneurs, there
exists a marked difference between Kenyans of African and of Asian origin
(hereafter we refer to these two categories as ‘Africans’ and ‘Asians’,
respectively). Ethnicity is a politically sensitive issue in Kenyan political life
and is potentially of great importance in the analysis because these groups have
access to distinct sets of economic networks. Only two informal firms in our
sample are run by Asians compared to 69 managed by Africans. The 40 formal
firms are more equally distributed as can be seen in Table 1. Hence, in the
                                                          
10 The number refers to the mean number of workers per firms during the sample
period, rounded down to the nearest integer, and was set in order to include all
informal firms except two abnormally large ones.
11 These approximations, drawn from Bigsten and Kimuyu, are not very precise and
vary substantially across sectors. As the distribution of informal firms was not
available between the 1-5 and 6-20 worker categories in the population was not
available, this was assumed the same as in the sample.12
descriptive analyses that follow, we will restrict our attention to only three
categories, excluding the cell with Asian-managed informal firms.
Table 1. The sample distribution of formal and informal firms by ethnicity. The























Within the sub-sample, the four categories of companies vary in size. Formal
Asian-managed firms have on average 7.6 workers, compared to 6.0 for
African-managed formal firms and 4.2 for African-owned informal
establishments.
4.2. Start-up
Why do some firms start up as informal whereas others begin as formal
establishments? The background of the entrepreneur is presented in table 2 and
may provide some clues. Human capital appears to play some role.
Owner/managers
12 of formal firms are older, have more experience of life in the
city and have higher rates of professional and university education at the start-
up point than do informal ones. Due to a large number of missing values, it is
dubious to draw any strong conclusions about ethnic differences among formal
firms. Nevertheless, the data suggest that Asian managers are somewhat
younger, have some more years of experience of the city and do not hold a
professional diploma as often as do the African entrepreneurs. The father’s
occupation also differs between the groups. It is much more common for the
fathers of Asian managers to have manufacturing background than it is for
African managers. Likewise, fathers of the African managers tend to a larger
extent to come from farming activities. The start-up capital appears to come
mainly from own savings for formal and informal, Asian and African firms,
                                                          
12 Although not always evident in the data, these persons are usually the same person.
From here on, that is assumed, and the acronyms ‘manager’ and ‘owner’ are used
interchangeably.13
alike. Hence, the suggestion that the Asian community is more supportive in
terms of start-up credit is not confirmed in the data.
Ethnicity may have an influence on the choice of formality status when the
firm is born. Kenyans of Asian origin have often a longer history of urban
business activities than Kenyans of African origin. Kinship and community ties
among Asians seem to be tighter and more supportive, and there is weak
integration of the Asian and African business spheres. These factors may reduce
the barriers for entering the formal sector for Asians and hence partly explain
why hardly any Asian-managed firms are informal. The educational differences
between African and Asian entrepreneurs are relatively insignificant.
Table 2. Variables on owner/manager’s background






Highest education level for
owner/manager:
     Secondary School (30%) 31% 34%
     Professional Diploma (30%) 46% 18%
     University Diploma (10%) 8% 3%
Owner’s father had manufacturing
firm
(40%) 8% 20%
Owner’s father was a farmer: (20%) 38% 38%
% of start-up capital financed by:
     Own savings (93%) 68% 81%
     Borrowings from relatives &
     friends
(0) 9% 9%
Age of owner at start-up (31) 35 29
Years in town by owner at start-up (15) 12 8
NOTE:  The statistics are computed using mean values for the periods in which
the firm is observed. Cell statistics with more than 50% missing values
are in parentheses.
To separate the effects of these variations in the data on the formality-
informality decision, a simple binary choice model was estimated modelling the
choice of formality status (IS=1 for informal, IS=0 for formal firms) as a
function of some of the variables in table 2. Probit estimates are presented in
Table 3.
As expected the parameter estimate for the African owner dummy is positive
and significant. A discrete change in this dummy from 0 to 1 increases the14
probability of choosing informal status by a massive 0.825 given the mean of
the other explanatory variables. We cannot very definitely say that this is due to
the network factor presented in Section 2, but it could be one plausible
explanation. Africans are also less likely to attract attention when they start
informally, while Asians are more prone to harassment from the authorities.
A professional diploma and higher age of the entrepreneur significantly
reduces the probability of being informal. Hence, human capital seems to matter
in the decision. A professional degree seems to stimulate the owner to register
the enterprise. His age does the same, which could be explained by greater
experience, a preference for being official and ‘secure’, or better relationships
with the authorities that may have taken time to establish. Although other
variables are insignificant, these results are robust to alternative specifications.
13
Table 3. Probit estimates of the choice of formality status at start-up.
Model parameters Marginal effects
Variable Coef. S. E. DF/dx S. E
Constant -1.27 (0.99)
Wood sector$ 0.50 (0.56) 0.14 (0.15)
Textile sector$ 0.07 (0.57) 0.02 (0.17)
Metal sector$ 0.50 (0.62) 0.14 (0.15)
African owner$ 2.81* (0.53) 0.825* (0.065)
Owner holds a secondary school
certificate$
0.54 (0.43) 0.15 (0.11)
Owner holds a professional
degree$
-0.90* (0.39) -0.31* (0.14)
Log(owner’s age at start-up) -0.029# (0.017) -0.0089# (0.0050)
Owner’s father had manufacturing
firm$
0.74 (0.58) 0.19 (0.11)
Owner’s father was a farmer$ 0.22 (0.40) 0.06 (0.12)
No of observations 76
Log Likelihood -28.71
Pseudo R-square 0.37
NOTE: The dependent variable is given by IS=1 for informal and IS=0 for
formal firms. Robust standard errors (S. E.) reported in parentheses.
*) and #) denote significant difference of means at the 5% and 10%-
levels.
$ denotes dummy variables for which the marginal effects refers to a
discrete change from 0 to 1.
                                                          
13 The linear probability (OLS, with and without robust standard errors) and logit
models produce qualitatively the same results. Adding some of the other variables in
the tables 1 and 3 gives insignificant estimates and does not alter the basic findings
presented above.15
Since registration involves costs both pecuniary and time related, these costs
form part of the motivation for starting informally. Africans are less likely to
attract official attention when they avoid such registration, while Asians are
either more prone to harassment from the authorities or simply perceive
themselves as such. Considering that Asians are an immigrant minority and the
political leadership in Kenya is predominantly African, misdeeds by African
businesspersons are likely to be more tolerated than those by their Asian
counterparts, who are often objects of mistrust.
4.3 Production
Once the choice of formality status is made, one would expect the firms to
behave and to be treated differently with respect to a number of aspects. This
and the two following subsections briefly investigate some of these differences,
including variables relating to wages, taxes and finance.
The notion expressed in the literature that wages are lower in the informal
sector is not univocally supported by the data in Table 4. Wages vary more by
ethnicity than formality status. Wages in Asian-managed firms are higher than
those in African-managed firms, while wages in the latter are basically the same
in the formal and informal sectors. This outcome suggests that Asian firms are
more inclined to show regard to minimum wage legislation, which tends to
generate wage rates that are higher than the market clearing wage rates due to
the labour surplus nature of the Kenyan economy. Asian firms are also more
capital intensive as well as more productive than African firms. Capital
intensity as well as the capital productivity is higher in Asian- compared to
African-managed formal firms. African firms do not seem to choose to be
informal because of lower direct wage costs, although the higher flexibility in
labour contracts may be cost saving. There is a large difference between capital
intensity in formal and informal African-managed firms, where the former are
about five times more capital intensive. The incidence of tax payments
conforms better to the presumed relationships: more than half of the formal
companies pay company tax, and almost a third pay value-added tax. A
negligible number of informal establishments pay any of these taxes.16
Table 4. Production and financial variables.




Capital/Labour /a 151 83 18
Output/Capital /b 1.7 0.5 8.0
Skilled annual wage rate /c 31 27 27
Unskilled annual wage rate /c 27 21 22
Pays company tax 62% 50% 2%
Pays VAT 39% 10% 3%
Has overdraft facility at a
bank
43% 23% 6%
Rates lack of credit as the no
1 problem
13% 29% 42%
Owes money to suppliers 50% 25% 11%
Latest major investment
financed by:
     Company retained
earnings
70% 77% 48%
     Personal savings 2% 10% 34%
     Bank loans 7% 13% 4%
NOTE: The statistics are computed using mean values for the periods in which
the firm is observed. Cell statistics with more than 50% missing values
are in parentheses.
/a Median values in thousands of 1992 Kenyan Shillings.
/b Median values in 1992 Kenyan Shillings.
/c Median values of mean individual rates per firm in thousands of Kenyan
Shillings.
Although informal producers benefited from the ability to avoid paying tax,
they are less fortunate in terms of the various finance variables. There are
significant formal-informal differences in terms of possession of overdraft
facilities, rating credit as the most serious problem, and being trusted by
suppliers of intermediate inputs to delay payments. In essence, this picture is
consistent with the literature. Similar significant differences are also evident
between Asian- and African-managed enterprises, where the problems of the
latter category closely resemble those of the informal companies.
The sources of financing for the latest major investment also differs
significantly across sectors: formal firms are more often able to utilise retained
earnings for these activities, whereas informal firms to a considerable degree
must rely on personal savings. This may indicate that the overall earnings of
informal firms generally are lower. Also notable is that bank loans is an
uncommon source of finance for both formal and informal small firms.17
Nevertheless, it is evident that while the financial markets generally
discriminate against small manufacturers, this discrimination is more acute for
the small informal firms. The network effect of the ethnic factor comes into
play in the access and use of credit. Since Asian businesspersons network more
intensively, they enjoy a greater network effect in this regard.
Assuming that formal and informal firms produce more or less the same
products
14, it is possible to compare the two sectors in terms of how well they
transform inputs into outputs using production function models. Indeed, much
of the debate on the informal sector reviewed in section 2 has been on the
relative performance of informal production. To contribute empirically to that
debate, we present the results of one average response production function
models (OLS), and one stochastic frontier production function model (SFA), in
Table 5. A common Cobb-Douglas technology with capital and labour is
assumed
15 augmented with intercept shifts for the various sectors and survey
waves.
Although the capital elasticity is rather low relative to that of labour,
constant returns to scale cannot be rejected, which is in accordance to other
studies based on the RPED data. The central message of the OLS-model,
however, is the weakly positive and insignificant estimate of the informal
dummy variable together with the much stronger negative and significant
impact of the African dummy. The coefficient suggests that output is less than
half in an African-managed firm, which is a suspiciously high effect.
Among the control variables, it is striking that the coefficient for owner’s
age is negative and significant, indicating a reduction of output with more than
3% per year, whereas firm age has virtually no effect. This suggests that
learning is not a major factor for these firms, and that rising age of the manager
                                                          
14 Listings of the most important outputs by firms does not indicate that formal and
informal goods are not substitutes. Neither do they suggest that informal firms are
more diversified.
15 Intermediate inputs was not included in the production function because of poor
accuracy. Omitting this variable still produces the correct input elasticities provided
that intermediate inputs is proportional to output, which is a hypothesis we maintain in
the OLS and SFA models.18
reduces his ability to maintain productivity. Access to an overdraft facility is
associated with significantly higher productivity, but again is the estimate
implausibly high, indicating that it may proxy ability or viability of the firm.
These results, including the magnitudes of the parameter estimates of overdraft
and African ownership, are robust to alternative specifications.
16
The networks for Asians and Africans in Kenya are different, and since they
often move in different circles, go to different clubs, don’t intermarry etc. their
integration has been limited. The Asian community did get a head start relative
to the African community in manufacturing, and the Asian minority has also
been under pressure from the rest of the Kenyan society, which has increased
internal cohesion. For Asian in business, this cohesion expresses itself in
extensive Asian-Asian trade credit, preferential treatment in input supply and in
financial assistance. The implication is that while business experience
accumulated through generations of involvement in business account for most
of the productivity differences, network effects are also important.
                                                          
16 Panel data models are rejected at the 5%-level as shown in the table. Nevertheless,
they produce very similar results. Separate models per sectors and years produce
approximately the same results, but most coefficients are insignificant and sometimes
very unstable. The translog specification of the technology was rejected in all
estimations.19
Table 5 Parameter estimates of OLS and stochastic frontier production function
models.
OLS SFA
Variable Coefficient. Std error Coefficient Std error
Constant 13.04* (0.80) 11.69* (0.59)
log(Capital) 0.085 (0.061) 0.106* (0.048)
log(Workers) 0.80* (0.13) 0.91* (0.13)
Wood sector -0.36 (0.27) -0.60* (0.28)
Textile sector -0.51* (0.25) -0.40 (0.28)
Metal sector -0.17 (0.27) -0.34 (0.28)
Wave 2 -0.12 (0.18) -0.15 (0.17)
Wave 3 -0.33# (0.18) -0.26 (0.17)
Informal sector -0.04 (0.24)
African owner -0.87* (0.21)
Overdraft facility 0.44* (0.20)
Owner holds a professional
degree
0.11 (0.16)
firm age 0.0090 (0.0060)
age of owner -0.0319* (0.0090)
Number of firms 91 107
Number of observations 224 251
R-square 0.50
log-likelihood -325.17 -404.30
Breusch and Pagan test







Likelihood ratio test for
inefficiency effects (c)
LR-stat(1) = 10.31
Prob>LR-stat = (< 5%)
(a) This is the Breusch and Pagan multiplier test of the null that the firm-specific
errors are zero (vi = 0).
(b) This is the Hausman specification test of the null that the firm-specific errors
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
(c) This is the test for the inefficiency effects in the Battese and Coelli (1992)
model, which has approximately a mixed chi-square distribution. For critical
values, see Kodde and Palm (1986).
*) and #) denote significance at the 5% and 10%-levels.
Robust standard errors reported for the OLS-model.
Table 5 also presents the results of a stochastic frontier model, which is
specified as a special case of the model proposed by Battese and Coelli20
(1992).
17 This model predicts technical efficiencies (TE) for each of the sample
firms, defined as, TE = exp(-ui), where ui is a non-negative error term
associated with inefficiency for the i’th firm. These predictions belong to the
[0.1]-interval in which the right end corresponds to full technical efficiency (TE
= 1.0).
With respect to the common variables, the SFA model reports parameter
estimates similar to the OLS model. The predicted firm-level technical
efficiencies are summarised in Table 6, which gives the same general picture as
above: Productivity and efficiency vary both with ethnicity and formality status.
African-managed formal units perform worse than not only Asian-managed
formal companies, but also relative to informal African controlled enterprises.
This is a striking result, which provides further support for our hypothesis that
African entrepreneurs have better access to an efficiency enhancing economic
network within the informal sector than in the formal sector and vice versa for
Asian entrepreneurs.
Table 6 Mean predicted technical efficiencies.
Formal Informal All
African 0.43 0.50 0.49
Asian 0.61 0.50 0.60
All 0.54 0.50 0.52
We should note, however, that there is a large variation around these
average measures of performance. Particularly the informal enterprises
display a large variation in efficiency, and all categories overlap each other.
4.4 Firm  growth
Do differences in productivity and technical efficiency affect growth rates of
firms? The widely cited Jovanovic (1982) model assumes this implicitly. The
model predicts that firm growth is a decreasing function of size and age, and
                                                          
17 The model estimated is identical to the Battese and Coelli (1992) model with the
efficiency time trend parameter, η , and the parameter for the mean of the truncated
distribution of the error term, µ , which is associated with technical inefficiency in
production, restricted to zero. See the original source and Coelli (1994) for details. The
model was estimated using FRONTIER 4.1b.21
this has gained empirical support (McPherson 1997). Another prediction is that
efficient firms grow over time and therefore are comparably large, while less
efficient stay small or exit, which has received some empirical backing in
Kenyan and Ethiopian manufacturing industries (Lundvall and Battese, 1998,
Mengistae 1996). Table 7 appears to support the Jovanovic theory; the smaller
informal firms are younger, grow faster and invest more often than do formal
firms, irrespective of the ethnicity of the manager. The investment-to-capital
rate is significantly higher for informal firms, whereas the investment-to-output
rate is about the same as for the two formal categories of establishments.
Turning to ethnic patterns, we again discover significant differences.
African-managed formal companies display negative growth rates, but despite
that they invest as often and at higher rates than Asian-managed companies.
Together with the evidence from the previous section, this may indicate that
African-owned enterprises during the survey years were involved in
substitution of capital for labour, a process that incurred some costs in terms of
forgone output and thereby lowered productivity and efficiency. This possibility
is plausible since the survey was conducted during a period of rapid
implementation of reforms.
Table 7. Firm growth.
Formal (40) Informal (71)
Variable: Asian (24) African
(16)
African (69)
Average labour growth rate  /a 0% -5% 8%
Firm age 29 18 10
Proportion investing firms 33% 34% 48%
Investment/Capital  /b 4% 10% 24%
Investment/Output  /b 4% 8% 5%
NOTE:
/a The growth rate is in logarithmic form and defined as, growth =
log(Lt/Lt-1), where L and t denote the number of workers and the
measurement period.
/b     The ratios are computed for investing firms only.  
These findings hold when analysed for separate years, with the exception of
the last year of the survey. Nevertheless, factors other than ethnicity and
formality status may lie behind these relationships, including firm age and size.
In order to control for these, a model of firm growth was estimated, including22
variables for age and size on the right-hand side of the equation. In order to
avoid spurious correlation between the size variable and the dependent growth
variable, this variable was entered with a lag of one year, as suggested by Teal
(1998) and Parker (1996). The results are reported in Table 8. Model 2 is the
same as model 1 except for the inclusion of squares and interactions of size and
age, and three additional control variables. Both models neutralise the tentative
conclusion from Table 7 that informality by itself would be associated with
higher growth rates. Instead, this relationship is only a function of firm size,
which, in accordance with the literature, is negative. The African dummy
exhibits a weak tendency of being negatively associated with growth in Model
1, but this effect disappears as more variables are included in Model 2. All other
variables appear insignificant, both individually and jointly, as indicated in the
table.
18
                                                          
18 Some caution is appropriate in the interpretation of these results given that the firms
that dropped out from the survey between the years are ignored in the analysis.
Nevertheless, the dropout rates are approximately the same for each of the four
categories of firms (22 firms dropped out in waves 2 and 3, including 7 formal and 15
informal, or, 6 Asian- and 16 African-managed). Unfortunately, we do not have a
complete picture of which firms closed, moved or were acquired by other enterprises.
If all informal firms that left the sample closed, while all the formal firms simply
shifted to another location, our informal growth estimates are biased upwards.
However, we would argue that there is no a priori reason to believe that is so. Although
the literature suggests higher death rates among informal firms, they also change
location more often. Hence, given that the firm has dropped out, there is no immediate
reason to suspect that the probability of default is higher for informal compared to
formal firms.23
Table 8. Ordinary least-squares parameter estimates of firm growth model. The
dependent variable is defined as log(Lt/Lt-1).
Model 1 Model 2
Variable     (parameter label) Coefficient Std error Coefficient Std error
Constant (β 0) 0.76* (0.17) 1.00 (0.69)
log(Lt-1) (β 1) -0.296* (0.047) -0.44* (0.17)
[log(Lt-1)]
2 (β 2) 0.032 (0.054)
log(firm age) (β 3) -0.049 (0.038) -0.05 (0.18)
[log(firm age)]
2 (β 4) -0.004 (0.038)
[log(Lt-1)]× [log(firm age)] (β 5) 0.009 (0.055)
Wood sector (β 6) -0.135 (0.086) -0.153 (0.097)
Textile sector (β 7) -0.142# (0.084) -0.193* (0.092)
Metal sector (β 8) -0.115 (0.099) -0.15 (0.11)
Wave 2 (β 9) 0.135* (0.068) 0.135* (0.068)
Wave 3 (β 10) 0.031 (0.066) 0.075 (0.069)
Informal sector (β 11) -0.059 (0.086) -0.08 (0.12)
African owner (β 12) -0.132# (0.076) -0.096 (0.092)
Overdraft facility (β 13) 0.088 (0.074)
Owner has prof degree (β 14) -0.014 (0.087)
log (age of owner) (β 15) -0.03 (0.16)
Number of firms 96 93




H0: β 11 = β 12 = 0
F(2,218) = 2.69
P r o b>F=0.07
F(2,201) = 1.56
P r o b>F=0.21
H0: β 13 = β 14= β 15 = 0
F(3,201) = 0.50
P r o b>F=0.69
H0: β 2 = β 4= β 5 = 0
F(3,201) = 0.16
P r o b>F=0.93
NOTE: *) and #) denote significance at the 5% and 10%-levels with robust
standard errors.
5. Conclusions
We have tried to answer the question of why firms choose to become informal
and which firms choose to become informal. Although the small firm segment
is dominated by informal enterprises, formal units of very small size exist, and
their characteristics and the environment they operate in are not the same.
Compared to formal companies, informal firms are almost never owned by
Kenyans of Asian origin, live under more restricted financial conditions, and
have less educated managers. These findings are not surprising, but the fact that
informal investment and growth rates are higher is. Informal African firms are
less efficient than Asian managed formal firms, but more efficient than those24
managed by Africans. This suggests that African entrepreneur may have an
advantage in the form of an economic network within the informal sector, while
the Asian entrepreneurs have a corresponding advantage in the formal sector.
This would partially explain why it seems natural for Asian entrepreneurs to
enter the formal sector, while it is more advantageous for most African
entrepreneurs to enter the informal sector. But it is also true that the political
system in Kenya shows more understanding when African businesses fail to
register. On the other hand and perhaps on account of feeling insecure, Asian
business persons network more intensively, partly accounting for the relatively
higher productivity of Asian businesses.
If these interpretation hold, the scope for a policy to lift African
entrepreneurs out of the informal into the formal sector may be hard to define.
Better credit arrangements and more education may not be sufficient to achieve
the desired end. Given the existing set of constraints and networks, it seems as
if the African entrepreneurs choice of informality is, individually, optimal. It
may, however, lead to a socially suboptimal allocation of investment, although
both the Asian and the African investors invest in the sector where their
investment pays best given their access to network externalities. This pattern of
investment would thus be a drag on growth as well as on the government tax
base.
There is thus a need for government  intervention, but perhaps it has to take
other forms than normally envisaged. One could for example introduce
measures helping African entrepreneurs overcome information asymmetries.
This might include institutions that provide information about the credit-
worthiness of economic agents, trade journals etc. One could also envisage
systematic attempts at linking the informal sector to the formal one to achieve a
dynamic link. This could help integrate the different business networks. More
effective and cheaper commercial courts could also make it more attractive to
enter the formal sector and reduce the negative external costs of being poorly
connected. The longer-term implications of this might be that African
entrepreneurs will find it in their interest to become formal, and this is certainly
desirable from the government’s point of view. Tax revenues would be25
enhanced, and these could in turn be used, among other things, to provide
infrastructure for further firm growth.
There are of course also more traditional measures that could be used to shift
the cost-benefit balance in favour of formal firms. This could include
simplification of registration and licensing procedures, tax-breaks, and the
provision of a better infrastructure for small formal firms, and the extension of
institutions providing credit to small firms.
We must note, though, that the informal African firms have expanded at a
very rapid rate in Kenya, indicating that they have been able to deal with the
recent economic turbulence. This seems to suggest that one should avoid rash
measures to formalise the informal firms, which at present provides a livelihood
for a very large part of the Kenyan population. The sector is also an avenue
through which unskilled persons that move from rural to urban areas acquire
skills that enable them to survive in a more challenging urban environment.
Urban informal employment also results from the limited formal sector
employment opportunities and the presence of young graduates from vocational
training institutions, whose curriculum is conventional and offers little
specialised skills and therefore limited opportunity for penetrating the formal
labour market. The graduates end up picking up apprenticeships in the Jua Kali
sector to develop specific skills necessary for direct employment in the sector.
The sector is also attractive for skilled persons who either lose formal sector
jobs or are newcomers into self-employment, taking advantage of the failures of
the formal sector to offer some goods and services on competitive terms.
19
It does not seem very likely, though, that this form of organisation can be the
basis for a long-term sustainable growth and for a functioning public sector.
The search for policy packages that can help shift firms out of informality is
therefore not futile, but policy interventions need to take account of the fact that
the different ethnic groups in Kenya have access to different economic
networks.
                                                          
19 Detailed analysis of the garments sector revealed that while making
extensive use of casual workers, the Jua Kali sector employs skilled workers for
direct deployment in production (Ongile and McCormick, 1996).26
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